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Housing Discrimination as a Basis for
Interdistrict School Desegregation
Remedies
The Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley1 erected
formidable barriers to interdistrict school desegregation relief. The Court
held that lower courts may not institute interdistrict remedies absent proof
of official discrimination in all school districts included in such remedies.
It is thus the exclusively white suburbs that are most immune to court-
ordered school desegregation. To the extent that residential segregation is
effective, official educational segregation disappears and so does the basis
for a court-ordered remedy.
This Note describes a means of overcoming the Milliken barriers-a
means the courts have used thus far only in a tentative and partial fash-
ion. Official housing discrimination should serve as a basis for metropoli-
tan school desegregation remedies even if plaintiffs offer no proof of dis-
crimination by school officials.' Use of this approach requires
surmounting an additional obstacle, apart from the Milliken barriers, that
stands in the way of intradistrict as well as interdistrict relief. The "tradi-
tional conception of adjudication" requires a neat conjunction between vi-
olation and remedy.3 Yet the housing approach requires one state agency
to remedy the violations of another. A school board might wonder why it
should remedy the wrongs of an altogether separate state agency.
4
Part I describes the limited extent to which courts have already used
this rationale. Part II discusses the precedents and empirical evidence sup-
porting the proposition that, where the segregative decisions of a state
housing agency cause school segregation, courts should adopt a single-
1. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
2. This Note focuses on housing violations, but actions by governmental agencies charged with
other kinds of functions have also promoted residential segregation and could provide additional bases
for interdistrict school relief. Decisions by zoning, land use, and highway officials have helped to cause
residential segregation. See, e.g., Sloane, Milliken v. Bradley and Residential Segregation, in U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Milliken v. Bradley: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR METROPOLITAN DFsF-
REGATION, CONFERENCE BEFORE THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS 85-86 (1976); cases cited
infra notes 14, 95. Much of this Note's analysis of housing violations applies to these decisions.
3. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1298
(1976).
4. The force of the continued reluctance to disregard this disjunction was illustrated in the St.
Louis school desegregation litigation. Citing undisputed evidence of discrimination by state housing
officials along with voluntary migration and socioeconomic factors as the causes of residential segrega-
tion, the court exonerated the school officials, even though Missouri had been joined as a defendant.
Liddell v. Board of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1323-24, 1363-64 (E.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd sub nor.
Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1291 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980).
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sovereign assumption to prevent officials of that school district from escap-
ing remedial measures. When such links are shown, recent decisions sug-
gest that courts may properly presume that state action has also distorted
the processes of local educational decisionmaking. Part III analyzes the
problems of proving causation and discriminatory intent that arise in ac-
tual application of this "housing approach."
I. THE PRESENT STATUS OF BASING SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
REMEDIES ON OFFICIAL HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
Although no claims of housing discrimination were before the Court in
Milliken, Justice Stewart asserted in a concurring opinion that housing or
zoning discrimination could justify interdistrict school desegregation re-
lief.5 This statement remains the only clear endorsement by a Supreme
Court Justice of the housing approach to school desegregation.
Since 1974, federal courts in Wilmington and Indianapolis have par-
tially based interdistrict school remedies on housing violations. In Wil-
mington, the court found that the municipal housing authority had juris-
diction to establish publicly assisted housing projects up to five miles
beyond the city limits, but as of 1972 had located fewer than forty of two
thousand units outside the city limits.6 This practice concentrated poor
and minority families inside Wilmington.7 The court's finding that this
practice intensified segregation in schools throughout the metropolitan
area helped to justify a sweeping eleven-district remedy.'
In Indianapolis, the municipal housing agency's area of operation simi-
larly extended five miles beyond the city limits in all directions.9 All
5. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring):
This is not to say, however, that an interdistrict remedy of the sort approved by the Court of
Appeals would not be proper, or even necessary, in other factual situations. Were it to be
shown, for example, that state officials had contributed to the separation of the races by draw-
ing or redrawing school district lines,. . . by transfer of school units between districts,. . . or
by purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws, then a decree calling
for transfer of pupils across district lines or for restructuring of district lines might well be
appropriate.
Although housing violations were not before the Court in Milliken, the district court had found hous-
ing violations by state officials and had partially based its decision on such violations. Bradley v.
Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (E.D. Mich. 1971). However, the court of appeals expressly did
not base its partial affirmance on these findings of housing violations. 484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir.
1973). The Supreme Court concluded that it had no questions concerning housing violations before it.
418 U.S. 717, 728 n.7 (1974).
6. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 435 (D. Del.) (Evans II) (three-judge court) (interdis-
trict remedy not barred by Milliken because interdistrict segregation in Evans significantly caused by
state action), aff'd per curiam, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
7. Id.
8. The court ordered the consolidation of 11 school districts. Id.
9. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 456 F. Supp. 183, 188-90 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (In-
dianapolis V), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101, 1109-10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 838 (1980).
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eleven public housing projects approved by the municipal and county
housing agencies since 1964 were located within the inner-city school dis-
trict, which was predominantly black.10 The determination that these
housing decisions affected school enrollments throughout the metropolitan
area formed part of the basis for a comprehensive metropolitan remedy.,
Successful intradistrict examples of the housing approach occurred in
Kalamazoo,12 Coney Island, 3 and other localities.14 In these cases, courts
imposed school desegregation orders on single districts partly on the basis
of findings of official housing discrimination. However, since the obstacles
to interdistrict relief are much higher, these intradistrict cases have limited
precedential force.
Despite the two interdistrict cases and the use of the housing approach
in several intradistrict cases, the housing approach remains an uncertain
strategy. The Court specifically reserved the question in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education."5 Whenever faced with a
lower court opinion addressing the housing approach, the Court has re-
solved the case without issuing an opinion."6 Moreover, Justice Stewart's
endorsement of the approach in his concurring opinion in Milliken came
in a single phrase at the end of a very long sentence.17 Though some
believe that Justice Stewart's words might provide an independent basis
10. Most of these projects consisted of single-family apartment units, and of these, 98% of the
occupants were blacks. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d at 1109.
11. Id.
12. See Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (school desegre-
gation order based on violations of school board and other state agencies), aff'd sub norm. Oliver v.
Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cerL denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
13. See Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.) (Coney Island school de-
segregation order based on violations of school board as well as state and federal housing bodies joined
as defendants), appeal dismissed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
14. See Ybarra v. City of San Jose, 503 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding improper dismissal of
suit by lower court where plaintiffs' case rested on "a legal principle so unsettled" as the claim that
zoning and building permit policies might justify school desegregation relief); Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F.
Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Reed I) (ordering desegregation based on violations by school board but
stressing that school policies should be seen in context of segregated public housing), later proceeding,
581 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935
(1980). In Chicago, the recent approval of an intradistrict remedy specifically attributed the perpetua-
tion of segregation in the city's schools to the continuing failure of housing authorities to counteract
residential segregation. United States v. Board of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 913 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(approving consent decree) ("[B]ecause racial patterns in a neighborhood school system obviously mir-
ror racial housing patterns, the continuing delinquencies of the City of Chicago's administrations in
not taking steps to arrest the growth, let alone change the pattern, of defacto segregation in housing
were major contributors to the problem.").
15. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (W.D.N.C.
1969), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the trial court found that school segregation resulted from myriad forms of
state action: zoning, city planning, urban renewal, public housing siting, and restrictive covenants.
The Supreme Court did not address these findings. 402 U.S. 1, 23 (1971).
16. See cases cited supra notes 6 (Wilmington), 9 (Indianapolis), 12 (Kalamazoo), 13 (Coney
Island), 14 (Cleveland), and infra note 21 (St. Louis).
17. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). See supra note 5.
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for relief,"8 others take the suggestion as merely an "offhand remark."1
No court has relied on the housing approach exclusively or even prima-
rily. In cases in which housing violations have influenced the terms of a
school desegregation remedy, courts have always found discrimination in
education as well.2 0 The St. Louis litigation promised to provide a prece-
dent for interdistrict relief heavily dependent on evidence of metropolitan
area-wide housing discrimination, but the parties settled." The Supreme
18. See, e.g., Sloane, supra note 2, at 81, 84 (at least five Justices would probably uphold metro-
politan relief on a showing that housing officials, not just school officials, were responsible for concen-
trating blacks in inner cities); W. Taylor, The Supreme Court and Urban Reality: A Tactical Analy-
sis of Milliken v. Bradley, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 751, 768-69 (1975) (calling attention to potential
importance of Justice Stewart's suggestion, sketching housing approach and stressing need for litiga-
tion to determine whether its promise is "real or illusory"); Note, Interdistrict Desegregation: The
Remaining Options, 28 STAN. L. REV. 521, 544 (1975) (causal link between housing discrimination
and school segregation not obvious but can be established).
19. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 29. See Amaker, Milliken v. Bradley: The
Meaning of the Constitution in School Desegregation Cases, in id. at 11, 13 (Stewart's approach
"refractory," even if one seizes upon his "advertence [sic] to the use of State housing or zoning laws
by State authorities to maintain segregation as one means of demonstrating the need for a metropoli-
tan remedy"). One survey of the status of interdistrict remedies dismisses Justice Stewart's proposed
housing approach in three sentences, citing the difficulty in showing the discriminatory intent of state
housing and zoning laws. See Note, Interdistrict Remedies for Segregated Schools, 79 COLuM. L. REV.
1168, 1176 (1979). However, discriminatory intent reflected in the actions and policies of housing and
zoning officials, as well as in the laws themselves, violates the equal protection clause. Cf. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (neutral licensing law applied in discriminatory fashion vio-
lates equal protection clause).
20. The Wilmington and Indianapolis decisions, for example, rest more heavily on one of the two
justifications for interdistrict relief that the Milliken majority allowed: the deliberate manipulation of
school district lines by school officials to preserve segregation. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745
(1974) ("Thus an interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts of one
or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have
been deliberately drawn on the basis of race."); id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring). See United States
v. Board of School Comm'rs, 456 F. Supp. 183, 187-88 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Indianapolis V), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101, 1106-08 (7th Cir.) (affirming district court on intentionally
segregatory manipulation of school district lines), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Evans v.
Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 445-46 (D. Del.) (three-judge court) (Evans II), aff'd per curiamn, 423
U.S. 963 (1975). "Manipulation" may mean failure to change district boundaries as political bounda-
ries change. For example, Indianapolis, Louisville and Kansas City have predominantly black inner
city school districts whose boundaries have been prevented from expanding as the cities have grown.
Kansas City now contains all or part of thirteen school districts. The inner city Kansas City Munid-
pal School District was originally contiguous with the city limits but was prevented from expanding
after the late 1950's and is now predominantly black while the other districts are predominantly
white. M. Wise, D. Field & S. Dougherty, Proposed Intervention in Black v. Missouri, Memoran-
dum Submitted to R. Rheinstein, Chief, General Litigation Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice 37-38
(1980) (on file with Yale Law Journal). See Newburg Area Council v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d
1358, 1361 (6th Cir. 1974) (confinement of Louisville school district to inner city core allows 10,000
mostly white students living inside city to attend county schools), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
21. The agreement to settle provided St. Louis County with the nation's first comprehensive,
voluntarily enacted busing program between a large city and its suburbs. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1983,
at Al, col. 5. All but one of the county's 23 school districts agreed to participate in a plan calling for
busing 15,000 black students from the city to suburban schools. Id. The settlement grew out of pro-
longed litigation that had already resulted in a court-imposed intradistrict remedy within the city of
St. Louis, based solely on the failure of school officials to desegregate after 1954. See Adams v. United
States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1291-97 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980). However, the court of
appeals indicated that all governmental policies tending to promote segregation could be important in
determining whether to order interdistrict relief. Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d at 1291, 1294 &
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Court, meanwhile, continues to emphasize the limits on the equitable re-
medial powers of the lower courts necessitated by federalism and local
self-determination.22
The courts have, in effect, experimented with the housing approach for
nine years since Milliken.28 The attraction of basing claims on the viola-
tions of housing officials is not only that it can justify broad metropolitan
relief, but also that it focuses the attention of the courts on the causes of
residential segregation, which is the fundamental source of contemporary
school segregation.
II. SCHOOL SEGREGATION BY NON-SCHOOL OFFICIALS AND THE
SINGLE-SOVEREIGN ASSUMPTION
A. Evasive Schemes and the Single-Sovereign Assumption
At first sight, the housing approach seems inconsistent with Milliken. If
purposeful racial discrimination by school officials in District X is insuffi-
cient under Milliken to justify court-ordered desegregation remedies in
District Y, purposeful racial discrimination by state housing officials ar-
guably also falls short of justifying remedies in District Y.
The Milliken bar to interdistrict relief, however, applies only where the
segregative effects of the violations by District X's school officials are con-
n.27. Housing violations and other state actions promoting residential segregation were an important
part of the plaintiffs' case in the proceedings considering the motion for interdistrict relief prior to the
settlement agreement of February 22, 1983. See Brief for Defendant 7-11, Liddell v. Board of Educ.,
No. 72-100-C(4) (E.D. Mo. 1982) (discussing addition of housing and land use authorities for
interdistrict phase of litigation). The housing approach is a part of the plaintiffs' strategy in suits
brought by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in Kansas City, Missouri, and by the U.S. Department
of Justice in Yonkers, New York. The Kansas City litigation has entered a new phase following
court-ordered realignment of the parties and dismissal of Kansas defendants. School Dist. v. Missouri,
460 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (rejecting defendants' motion for summary dismissal that
claimed, inter alia, legal insufficiency in plaintiffs' allegation that federal housing, highway and edu-
cational agencies caused school segregation), appeal dismissed, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979). This
suit is being continued with new parties and a new name. See Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848
(W.D. Mo. 1980).
22. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976) ("[Alppropriate consideration must be
given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief."); Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928 (1975) (efficient judicial administration subordinate to claims of
federalism). But see City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (principles of federalism
that might otherwise limit congressional authority necessarily overridden by power to enforce Four-
teenth Amendment); Fitzpatrick v. Bizer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (same). Skepticism about the
capacity of equitable remedies to effect meaningful social change reinforces these limits on equitable
remedies. See, e.g., Delaware State Bd. of Educ. v. Evans, 446 U.S. 923, 925-27 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that white flight outside control of school authorities
suggests futility of massive court-imposed integration); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Reed, 445 U.S. 935,
938 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (equitable decrees cannot fashion an
"Emerald City" where races and classes will live side by side).
23. The experiments are few but promising. As demographer Karl Taeuber recently remarked,
"[T]he jurisprudential link between school segregation and housing segregation is still in the develop-
ing stages and may have profound legal effects on both school law and housing law." Taeuber, Hous-
ing, Schools, and Incremental Segregative Effects, 441 ANNALS 157, 165 (1979).
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fined to District X. The Court in Milliken suggested an exception to the
general bar when school officials outside District Y cause segregation in
District Y.24 The availability of relief in District Y is therefore not neces-
sarily contingent upon a showing of discrimination by school officials in
District Y. This exception arguably involves no disjunction between viola-
tion and remedy, since the violators and the appliers of the remedy are all
agents of the education bureaucracy of the state government. Similarly,
the Milliken exception countenances the housing approach, since the vio-
lators and the appliers of the remedy are all agents of the same state gov-
ernment.25 Milliken itself thus provides some basis for the housing
approach.
Although Justice Stewart did not cite them, there are cases supporting
the housing approach.2" As the federal courts became attuned to the so-
phisticated "evasive schemes" available to states bent on avoiding desegre-
gation, the courts developed the argument that a disjunction between vio-
lation and remedy of the type involved in the housing approach is
overcome by a showing that an arm of the state caused school segregation.
In Cooper v. Aaron,27 the Supreme Court rejected an effort to delay
desegregation by the Little Rock School Board, which claimed that the
governor and state legislature were obstructing peaceful implementation of
24. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974); see supra note 20. For examples of interdis-
trict remedies based solely on the majority's two exceptions, see Morrilton School Dist. No. 32 v.
United States, 606 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1979) (two predominantly white school districts not
directly implicated in establishment of predominantly black districts included in remedy because "the
effects of the unconstitutional state action are felt in both districts"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1050 and
444 U.S. 1071 (1980); United States v. Missouri, 388 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Mo.) (ordering remedy
for three districts in St. Louis County where boundaries were drawn to preserve segregation), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.) (en banc), later opinion, 523 F.2d 885 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807, 822 (W.D. Pa. 1973)
(Hoots II) (state and county education officials drew school district boundaries "based wholly or in
part on" race of students involved), appeal dismissed, 495 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
884 (1974), remedy ordered, No. 71-538 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (Hoots VIII) (five-district consolidation and
desegregation ordered), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.) (Hoots IX), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 55 and 103
S. Ct. 172 (1982). The Hoots 1I court took note of the "pervasive" housing discrimination and resi-
dential segregation in the area but did not base its decision on findings of official housing violations.
Hoots II, 359 F. Supp. at 816 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
Since 1974, federal and state courts have held interdistrict remedies proper in nine cases. Hoots VIII
is the most recent. On the other eight, including two decisions that skirted Milliken by predicating
relief on state constitutional grounds, see School Desegregation: Hearings on H.J. Res. 56 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 671 & n.7 (1981) (report by C. Dale) [hereinafter cited as House Desegregation Hearings].
25. See infra p. 347.
26. The courts in the Wilmington and Indianapolis cases relied on Justice Stewart's phrasing to
support their partial adoption of the housing approach. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 438
(D. Del.) (three-judge court) (Evans 11), aff'd per curiam, 423 U.S. 963 (1975); United States v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 419 F. Supp. 180, 182 (S.D. Ind. 1975) (Indianapolis IV), aff'd, 541
F.2d 1211, 1222-23 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977). For similar
reliance on Stewart's concurrence, see Ybarra v. City of San Jose, 503 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir.
1974).
27. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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court-ordered desegregation measures."8 The Court held that, for Four-
teenth Amendment purposes, a local school board is an arm of the state,
and that when an arm of the state stands accused of equal protection vio-
lations, the state itself stands accused. A state, in other words, cannot de-
fend itself by pointing to its own obstructions.
Federal courts have struck down a number of other efforts to perpetu-
ate unconstitutional segregation by some fragmentation, reallocation, or
divestment of state governmental authority. A state may not, for example,
close public schools, lease them to educational cooperatives, and then fund
the schools when they reopen as nominally private schools run by the
existing school boards.29 With equal decisiveness, the courts have struck
down more oblique strategies for funneling public money for tuition pay-
ments to students attending nominally private segregated schools.30 The
Fourteenth Amendment speaks to the state, and state officials cannot es-
cape the force of the equal protection clause simply by splintering or re-
arranging authority. 1
The "evasive schemes" cases indicate that action by an arm of the state
that causes or perpetuates segregation in schools activates a single-
sovereign assumption. The single-sovereign assumption applies regardless
of how much independence the state constitution or statutes give to the
agency involved. The assumption may apply even to nominally private
agencies. 2 The same notion-that a state does not shield itself from the
28. Id. at 15-17.
29. See Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961) (three-judge
court), aff'd per curiam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
30. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (upholding power of federal courts to
reopen public schools where state of Virginia closed them and created tuition aid program for students
attending private schools); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.
La. 1967) (cnjoiding as segregative enforcement of statute setting up state commission to make tuition
grants), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp.
458 (M.D. Ala.) (three-judge court) (basing desegregation decree on various unconstitutional state
actions tending to promote segregation, including tuition grants, transportation, and survey officials'
recommendations on school sites), aff'd per curiain sub nor. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215
(1967); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 190 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1960) (enjoining state legisla-
ture's scheme to block access of local board to bank deposits where aim was to frustrate desegrega-
tion), aff'd per curiam sub norn. City of New Orleans v. Bush, 366 U.S. 212 (1961).
31. The Cooper Court held:
The command of the Fourteenth Amendment is that no 'State' shall deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . . 'The constitutional provision, therefore,
must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are
exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Who-
ever, by virtue of public position under a State government, . . . denies or takes away the
equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name
and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State.'
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1958) (quoting Ex pare Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880));
see Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 658 (E.D. La. 1961) (three-judge court)
(state may not "evade its constitutional responsibility by carve-outs of small units"), aff'd per curiam,
368 U.S. 515 (1962).
32. Examples include nominally private schools and educational cooperatives. See cases cited
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Fourteenth Amendment by splitting authority into a multiplicity of de-
partments-forms the jurisprudential foundation of the housing
approach.33
This foundation differs from the theories of agency and vicarious liabil-
ity rejected by the Court in Milliken.34 In Milliken, the Court found vio-
lations only by the Detroit school board.35 Apart from those violations, the
state had not created the dual school system. Plaintiffs relied on theories
of agency and vicarious liability to assert that state school officials were
responsible for the wrongdoing of the Detroit board. Such a rationale,
however, would justify not merely the metropolitan remedy sought by the
plaintiffs, but a statewide one. The Court therefore rejected these theories
as violating the rule of equity that a remedy must not exceed the extent of
the violation. 8
By contrast, the housing approach is limited in two ways. It does not
justify expansion of the remedy beyond the geographical area of operation
of the housing authority or other governmental entity found guilty of con-
stitutional violations. Further, the scope of the remedy is limited to the
extent to which official housing discrimination demonstrably caused school
segregation. Consequently, the housing approach is consistent with the
agency principle that seeks to prevent local agents of the state from escap-
ing participation in remedies for their own wrongdoing.1
7
supra notes 29-30.
33. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 410 (7th Cir. 1978) ("The
commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed at the state and cannot be avoided by a frag-
mentation of responsibility among various agents."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978) and 449 U.S.
838 (1980); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143, 183 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (state
"should not be allowed to escape constitutional responsibility by fractionalizing its jurisdiction through
many agencies"), aff'd sub nom. Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); United States v. Missouri, 363 F. Supp. 739, 748 (E.D.
Mo. 1973) (state "cannot escape responsibility for the racial discrimination disclosed in this case or
the obligation to correct the effects of such discrimination by neatly compartmentalizing the authority
and responsibility of its various instrumentalities"), supp. opinion, 388 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Mo.),
aff'd in part and ret'd in part, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.) (en banc), later opinion, 523 F.2d 885 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975).
34. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738, 744-46 (1974) (rejecting agency arguments); see
also Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 793 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Reed I) (governor not liable though
plaintiffs claimed that his appointment powers to state real estate and banking boards should make
him vicariously liable for actions of boards' members), later proceeding, 581 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1977),
aff'd in part, 607 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935 (1980).
35. See supra note 5.
36. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738, 744-46 (1974); see infra p. 355.
37. There are parallel applications of the single-sovereign assumption where the courts have held
that the Constitution protects other kinds of rights from state action. See, e.g., Gaston County v.
United States, 395 U.S. 285, 293, 296-97 (1969) (striking down otherwise valid and neutrally admin-
istered literacy test for voter registration to remedy wrongs of dual school system). The Court has also
evoked the single-sovereign assumption to protect the constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 394 (1970) (barring prosecution in a state court after prosecution in
municipal court because both are arms of same sovereign); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333,
354-55 (1907) (prosecution in federal court bars subsequent prosecution in court of United States
territory because both are arms of same sovereign); cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
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B. The Rationale for the Single-Sovereign Assumption is Fragmentation
of Authority, Not Danger of a Conspiracy
A possible objection to finding support for the housing approach in the
evasive schemes cases would be that housing-approach cases do not allege
deliberate conspiracies or collusion between housing and school officials.
Court opinions in two of the intradistrict housing approach cases stressed
that school officials were aware of housing decisions and policies.38 How-
ever, the evasive schemes cases are devoid of language suggesting that
courts must find active cooperation between governmental entities before
the entities will be treated as arms of the same sovereign. Indeed, in
Cooper v. Aaron, the Court conceded the "good faith" efforts of the Little
Rock School Board to integrate the city's schools.39
C. The Requirement of a Causal Connection
Plaintiffs relying on the housing approach must show a causal connec-
tion between the unconstitutional actions of state housing officials and the
430-31 (1971) (interpreting Title VII to require private corporation to adapt employment tests to
compensate for effects of dual school system).
38. See Reed I, 422 F. Supp. at 790; Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. at 184-85.
It might be possible to show collusion in some cases were it deemed necessary. In the Cleveland
intradistrict case, for example, the court found not only that school officials agreed to erect schools to
serve all-black housing projects, but also that assurances of the availability of adequate classroom
space were prerequisites to federal funding of the projects. See Reed I, 422 F. Supp. at 789.
39. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1958); id. at 21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The
Kalamazoo decision suggests a much looser version of this purely hypothetical collusion requirement
for desegregation relief-a showing that school officials knew of the discriminatory actions of housing
officials, or (looser still) should have known. The Kalamazoo district court apparently assumed
wrongly that one or the other of these two conditions had to be shown. The opinion stresses the
Kalamazoo School Board's "intimate knowledge" of residential areas in the city and "extensive know-
ledge" of the way public agencies, as well as private groups functioned. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of
Educ., 368 F. Supp. at 184-85. Consequently, the court held the school board liable for failure to
counteract school segregation resulting from official housing decisions. Id. at 185.
Similarly, in the Cleveland case, the district court used the evidence of official housing discrimina-
tion partly to demonstrate an intent to discriminate on the part of school officials. The court could not
lend credence to the school board's claim that its neighborhood school policy was racially neutral,
because many schools were built to serve housing projects that were racially identifiable from their
inception. Reed 1, 422 F. Supp. at 790.
This use of housing discrimination evidence to shed light on the discriminatory intent of school
officials is an alternate justification for school desegregation remedies independent of the housing ap-
proach, because it does not depend on activation of the single-sovereign assumption. If there were a
requirement that school officials know of the discriminatory impact of housing policies, it probably
would not be a significant obstacle for the housing approach inasmuch as it is hard to imagine a
school board without the level of public awareness the court found in the Kalamazoo case. But such a
requirement need not be fulfilled. The single-sovereign theory does not exist, or does not only exist, as
an antidote to the threat of conscious cooperation by agents of the state. It follows necessarily from the
language of the equal protection clause ("[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added)) and
serves as an antidote to the institutionalized compartmentalization of authority inherent in state gov-
ernments which often makes it difficult to pin the blame for some kinds of Fourteenth Amendment
violations on any one agency.
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racial composition of the schools in the district where desegregation reme-
dies are sought. Unless this requirement is met, defendants could easily
distinguish the evasive schemes cases, in which the causal connection is
always obvious. More fundamentally, satisfaction of the requirement is
dictated by the Supreme Court's doctrine that equitable remedies may not
exceed what is necessary to undo the effects of the violation."' A school
remedy for housing violations is therefore permissible only to the extent
that the violation caused school segregation.
Many court opinions reveal a general assumption or unverified hypoth-
esis that the causes of modern urban segregation are primarily non-
governmental. A finding of effective state action depends on how the
finder of fact weighs the various causes of segregation, but such opinions
assume a weighing that leaves little or no room for state action as a cause.
On the Supreme Court, several Justices take the view that voluntary mi-
gration, economic circumstances, and perhaps differing rates of birth
among the races have caused school segregation.4 Some lower court
judges share these beliefs.42 This attitude toward the causes of contempo-
rary urban segregation inhibits imposition of judicial remedies because the
courts cannot issue injunctions to counteract demographic and economic
change.
40. See infra p. 355.
41. For Justice Powell's views, see Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S.
437, 445 (1980) (per curiam) (Powell, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) ("In large cities, the
principal cause of segregation in the schools is residential segregation, which results largely from
demographic and economic conditions over which school authorities have no control."); Columbus Bd.
of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 480 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (residential segregation "caused
by social, economic and demographic forces for which no school board is responsible"); Austin Indep.
School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 994 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (principal cause of
racial and ethnic imbalance in urban public schools across nation is imbalance in residential patterns
"typically beyond the control of school authorities"). For Justice Stewart's views, see Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart also joined Justice
Powell's dissent in Estes. Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Powell's opinions in the Estes and Austin
cases. See also Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.)
(resegregation caused by "quite normal pattern of human migration" not attributable to school board).
Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Powell's concurrence in Austin. See also Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26, 31-32 (1971) (Burger, C.J.) (warning that few communi-
ties remain demographically stable and that, absent evidence that state officials have deliberately fixed
or altered demographic patterns to affect racial composition of schools, further intervention of courts is
unwarranted). For an early post-Milliken discussion of Supreme Court views of urban segregation,
see W. Taylor, supra note 18, at 760-63.
42. See, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058, 1066 (4th Cir. 1972) ("We think that the root
causes of the concentration of blacks in the inner cities of America are simply not known . . .");
Liddell v. Board of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1363 (E.D. Mo. 1979) ("The overwhelming, inexora-
ble cause of the racial imbalance in the schools is the aggregate movement of individuals in response to
economic forces."); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 449 (D. Del.) (Evans II) (three-judge
court) (Layton, J., dissenting) ("no definitive explanation for the huge tide of black immigration into
the nation's cities, and the white flight therefrom, in the past two decades"), aff'd per curian, 423
U.S. 963 (1975).
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No one questions that residential segregation causes school segregation.
Social scientists and the Court also agree to the converse proposition:
School segregation promotes residential segregation." In recognizing the
reciprocal influence of different forms of segregation, however, courts have
tended to close discussion before they address the real issue: the extent to
which state action, rather than private discrimination or demographic and
economic factors, causes residential segregation.
Social science research has for years offered conclusions at odds with
the non-responsibility of government hypothesis, 44 and the evidence con-
tinues to mount. Private volition becomes a less plausible explanation for
segregated neighborhoods as both blacks and whites become more favora-
bly disposed towards integrated neighborhoods. 45 Moreover, a broad na-
43. School segregation contributes to residential segregation in three important ways. First, fami-
lies deciding where to live often take the racial composition of local schools into account. Second,
public housing authorities often will not site units until school officials have agreed to provide educa-
tional facilities. Third, private developers of segregated housing often promise to dedicate land to a
school board in a new subdivision that agrees to erect a school on the land. For expressions of the
reciprocity theory by the Court and by social scientists, see Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449, 465 n.13 (1979); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 202 (1973); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971); Orfield, School Segregation and
Residential Segregation, in W. STEPHAN & J. FEAGIN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 227, 234-35
(1980); Taeuber, supra note 23, at 157 ("reciprocal interplay between housing and school
segregation").
44. See, e.g., K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CrTES 78-95 (1965) (demonstrating
with 1960 census data that socioeconomic factors are weak predictors of residential segregation); Far-
ley, Residential Segregation and Its Implications for School Integration, LAW & CoNrrMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1975, at 164, 174-77, 190 (similar conclusions based on 1970 census data).
45. On the attitudes of blacks, see Farley, Schuman, Bianchi, Colasanto & Hatchett, "Chocolate
City, Vanilla Suburbs": Will the Trends Toward Racially Separate Communities Continue?, 7 Soc.
Sc. RESEARCH 319, 321 (1978) (proportion of Detroit blacks preferring to live in racially mixed
neighborhoods rose from 56% in 1968 to 83% in 1976); Taeuber, Housing and School Segregation in
Indianapolis, INTEGRATEDUcATION, Jan.-Apr. 1979, at 14, 15-16 (author's "own studies" show
"overwhelming choice" of blacks is integrated neighborhoods). To be sure, some blacks and whites
still favor segregation, but these attitudes are themselves partly a product of official policies which, for
example, taught by direct example that school segregation is legitimate and desirable. Id. at 17. Blacks
who have had integrated educations, for example, are more likely to try to live in integrated neighbor-
hoods than blacks with segregated educations. Id. Blacks do not see moving from the ghettos to the
suburbs as deserting the black community. Farley, Bianchi & Colasanto, Barriers to the Racial Inte-
gration of Neighborhoods: The Detroit Case, 441 ANNALS 97, 111 (1979).
On the feelings of whites, see Orfield, supra note 43, at 231 n.1 (13% of whites in 1978 said they
would move if black family moved next door, compared to 35% in 1967 and 45% in 1963); Farley,
Bianchi & Colasanto, supra, at 105 (only 7% of Detroit whites would try to move upon arrival of first
black family in fifteen-house neighborhood and 23% with three of fifteen houses occupied by blacks);
D. Taylor, Housing, Neighborhoods and Race Relations: Recent Survey Evidence, 441 ANNALS 26,
33 (1979) (in national sample, only about 5% of whites object to new black neighbor of equal income
and education, a far more tolerant attitude than in 1965 poll); D. Taylor, Sheatsley & Greeley,
Attitudes Toward Racial Integration, 238 Sc. AM. 42, 43 (1978) (white attitudes toward residential
and educational integration became dramatically more favorable according to nationwide surveys in
1963, 1970, 1972, and 1976). Whites leave areas only when they fear their neighborhoods and schools
will become overwhelmingly black. See C. RossEL., ASSESSING THE UNINTENDED IMPACTS OF PUB-
LIC POLICY: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION (1978) (substantial white flight occurs
only in school districts more than 35% black); D. Taylor, supra, at 32, 34 (white reaction to neigh-
borhood integration depends primarily on the amount of integration they believe will eventually
occur).
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tional consensus has developed in support of integrated education.4 Social
scientists also agree that only interdistrict school integration over a wide
metropolitan area will effectively reduce the incentive for white flight and
stabilize residential integration.47
The theory that blacks do not move to the suburbs because they cannot
afford to has also been discredited. Blacks have made great economic
strides since World War II, but they have been unable to move out of the
ghettos in great numbers. Blacks generally have greater difficulty than
whites in finding suburban housing.48 Where black movement into the
suburbs has occurred, it has usually taken the form either of tentacle-like
Recent research has also confirmed that white flight from neighborhoods and schools significantly
increases during at least the first year of an intradistrict school desegregation remedy. See Armor,
White Flight and the Future of School Desegregation, in W. STEPHAN & J. FEAGIN, supra note 43,
at 188 (pointing out that two early critics of "white flight thesis," Farley and Rossell, have modified
their views and that there is now less disagreement on the fact of white flight when desegregation
occurs). For acknowledgments of the existence of white flight from scholars with a range of attitudes
toward busing, see House Desegregation Hearings, supra note 24, at 160 (statement of G. Orfield),
206 (statement of D. Armor), 217 (statement of C. Rossell); Court-Ordered School Busing: Hearings
on S. 528, S. 1005, S. 1147, S. 1647, S. 1743, and S. 1760 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1981) (statement of J. Ross)
[hereinafter cited as Senate School Busing Hearings]. According to Armor, studies have shown that
intradistrict busing plans are responsible for between 30% and 70% of the loss of white students in
Boston, Denver, Detroit, Los Angeles, Memphis, San Francisco, Dallas, Oklahoma City, Chatanooga,
Birmingham, Dayton, Omaha, and Seattle. House Desegregation Hearings, supra note 24, at 214
(statement of D. Armor). But see G. ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 97-101 (1978) (citing Berkeley,
Calif., and Evanston, Ill., as specific examples of towns where intradistrict desegregation has en-
couraged and stabilized residential integration); Taeuber, supra note 23, at 166 (citing Milwaukee as
similar example).
46. G. ORFIELD, supra note 45, at 108-09; D. Taylor, Sheatsley & Greeley, supra note 45, at 43
(graph) (more than 80% of whites in nationwide surveys in 1972 and 1976 favored integrated
education).
47. There is a growing consensus that intradistrict busing causes substantial immediate white
flight. See supra note 45. There seems to be equal agreement among social scientists that a metropoli-
tan remedy drastically reduces or eliminates white flight. For expressions of this latter view from
scholars with varied attitudes toward busing, see House Desegregation Hearings, supra note 24, at
160-61 (statement of G. Orfield), 194, 198-203 (statement of D. Pearce) (demonstrating empirically
that broad metropolitan remedies remove the incentives for whites to move), 216 (statement of D.
Armor), 220 (statement of C. Rossell); Senate School Busing Hearings, supra note 46, at 232 (state-
ment of R. Farley). For a specific study of the impact of an interdistrict remedy on white flight, see J.
RAFFEL, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: THE METROPOLITAN REMEDY IN DELA-
WARE 185-87 (1980). Compare Raffel, The Voters Grade the Metropolitan Desegregation Plan in
Delaware, INTEGRATEDUCATION, Jan.-Apr. 1980, at 64, 68-69 (white enrollments in New Castle
County, site of Wilmington suit, dropped only from 73.9% to 71% in first two years of interdistrict
desegregation, 1978-80, and this was part of a continual decline from 81.2% in 1971) with OFFICE ON
SCHOOL MONITORING & COMMUNITY RELATIONS, ENROLLMENT DECLINE AND SCHOOL DESEG.-
REGATION IN CLEVELAND: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS AND CAUSES 23 (1982) (showing substantial
white flight in first two years of intradistrict remedy, though attributing no more than 36% of this
flight to the remedy) and C. Rossell, A School Desegregation Plan for East Baton Rouge Parish,
study submitted to U.S. Dept. of Justice 7 (1983) (on file with Yale LawJournal) (showing drop in
white enrollments in elementary and secondary schools from 9640 to 4599 in first three years of
intradistrict remedy and attributing 48% of this flight to desegregation).
48. See Farley, supra note 44, at 190; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TwENTY YEARS AFR
Brown: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 13 (1975); Roof, The Shifting Basis of American Race
Relations, 441 ANNALS 1, 5-6 (1979).
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extensions of the inner city ghetto (e.g., East Cleveland) or of a new mini-
ghetto (e.g., Pontiac, Michigan).49 On average, blacks still make less
money than whites.50 However, as recent work on census data shows,
most suburbs are closed to blacks no matter what their incomes.51 Nor are
blacks misinformed about the availability of suburban housing."' The
view that government is significantly responsible for residential segrega-
tion in American cities is therefore not a tentative hypothesis among social
scientists, nor the subject of significant controversy. 58
It is possible to be overly pessimistic about the impotence of this re-
search to affect judicial outcomes." Unlike most arguments in legal briefs,
social science evidence works gradually over time to change judges' per-
ceptions about social reality. 5 Though no Justice has renounced previous
assumptions that state action has little to do with residential segregation,
56
49. See Pettigrew, A Sociological View of the Post-Milliken Era, in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 53, 60; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 131, 134; Roof,
supra note 48, at 7.
50. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PER-
SONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-60, No. 132, Table
2 (median household income in current dollars rose between 1967 and 1980 from $7,449 to $18,684
for whites, and from $4,325 to $10,764 for blacks).
51. Farley, Bianchi & Colasanto, supra note 45, at 99 (Detroit study). On the basis of 1970
census data, urban demographers demonstrate that if income were the only factor, more than twice as
many blacks would live in New York's suburbs as actually do, more than four times as many in
Detroit's and Cleveland's, nearly six times as many in Chicago's and ten times as many in Balti-
more's. Farley, supra note 44, at 175-76 (fig. 4) (actual proportion of blacks in suburbs versus pro-
portion expected on basis of 1970 income for 15 large cities); Taeuber, supra note 45, at 14-15
(reporting various statistical examinations showing that economic factors are not sufficient or even
primary explanation for racial residential segregation). But see Wolf, Northern School Desegregation
and Residential Choice, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 73-74 (estimates of importance of economic factors
vary).
52. See Farley, Bianchi & Colasanto, supra note 45, at 111.
53. To dramatize their consensus, thirty-seven prominent social scientists signed a "Social Science
Statement" on school and residential segregation published in 1980. Among the chief assertions of this
unusual manifesto is a forceful statement of governmental responsibility for residential segregation.
See Orfield, supra note 43, at 233-34 ("Thus will past discriminatory practices of the FHA and other
housing agencies continue for decades to come to exert an influence on the racial structure of the
nation's metropolitan areas."); see also G. ORFIELD, supra note 45, at 408-09; U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 167-68 (criticizing federal government's role in causing residential
segregation). The authors originally drafted the statement in support of the Columbus and Dayton
desegregation suits before the Supreme Court, apparently to counteract the tendency of courts to dis-
count social science studies on the grounds of inconclusiveness or disagreement among scholars.
54. E.g., Yudof, School Desegregation, Legal Realin, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science
Research in the Supreme Court, LAW & CONTMP. PROBS., Autumn 1978, at 57, 62, 70, 89 (courts
disinclined to give much credence to social science research because of "vagaries of the research,"
"disputations over methodology," and "policy conclusions"); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 75 n.22 (1980) (plurality opinion) (denigrating social science evidence that an ethnic minor-
ity lacks political influence as "gauzy sociological considerations").
55. See W. Taylor, The Supreme Court and Recent School Desegregation Cases: The Role of
Social Science in a Period ofJudicial Retrenchment, LAW & CONTEMP. PRoas., Autumn 1978, at 37,
39; see also Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 3, 4-9 (1977) (social
science interpretations-such as interpretation that school desegregation stigmatizes blacks-as distinct
from causal judgments, have influenced many desegregation decisions).
56. See supra p. 349.
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it may be cause for some hope that no Justice has espoused the non-
responsibility of government hypothesis in print since 1980."'
D. Local Control of Education
The Milliken Court stressed the damage such court orders purportedly
do to local control and autonomy in educational decisionmaking. 8 In
Hills v. Gautreaux,59 the Court held that Milliken allows courts to order
remedies beyond the municipal boundaries where the constitutional viola-
tion occurred. Milliken only limits the power of the courts to interfere
with the operation of local governmental entities not implicated in uncon-
stitutional conduct.60 In Hills, Milliken posed no obstacle to a metropoli-
tan housing remedy because housing had not been the responsibility of
local governmental entities.61 In devising school desegregation remedies,
however, the courts must take into account the interests of local authorities
in managing their own affairs.6" In fact, the Hills Court explained that
even clear evidence of constitutional violations by state officials might not
justify interdistrict school desegregation relief where the state educational
structure vests substantial independence in local school districts.63 Even if
metropolitan remedies are reconcilable with local control,e6 concern for
57. The non-responsibility of government hypothesis does not, for example, appear in either of
the two dissents from denials of certiorari authored by Justice Rehnquist in 1980. Delaware State Bd.
of Educ. v. Evans, 446 U.S. 923 (1980) (Evans VIII) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Reed, 445 U.S. 935 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). But cf. supra note 41.
58. 418 U.S. 717, 741-43 (1974).
59. 425 U.S. 284 (1976). Hills was a suit against the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) for its role in assisting the Chicago Housing Authority's racially dis-
criminatory housing program. Id. at 289.
60. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 298 (metropolitan area-wide housing remedy consistent with
Milliken because it does not compromise authority or interfere with operation of local governmental
entities).
61. Id. at 300-06.
62. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (Milliken II); Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 741-43 (1974) (Milliken I); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 294-96.
63. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 296, 298 nn.13-14.
64. See Gittel, The Political Implications of Milliken v. Bradley, in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 41 (considerable room remains for decentralized decisionmaking within the
context of state-funded metropolitan desegregation); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT
ON METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 49 (1977) (apart from ensuring that students are as-
signed to schools in a nondiscriminatory way, there would be no need to centralize authority over
other aspects of educational process); W. Taylor, Metropolitan Remedies for Public School Discrimi-
nation, 10 URE. REV. 188-89 (1978) (decisions about hiring faculty and administrators, about curric-
ulum and budget can remain highly localized and coexist with interdistrict student assignment)..
On the specific example of the Wilmington remedy, compare Delaware State Bd. of Educ. v. Evans,
446 U.S. 923, 923 (1980) (Evans VIII) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Wil-
mington remedy labeled "more Draconian than any ever approved by this Court") with J. RAFFEL,
supra note 47, at 195, 210-14 (stressing relative success of Wilmington remedy because of broad,
active community participation in planning and implementing desegregative measures) and Raffel,
supra note 47, at 64, 71 (popular dissatisfaction with public education results as much from county's
failure to solve administrative problems as from busing and student reassignment).
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local control will restrict both the scope and the type of relief that the
courts will grant.6 5
Until 1982, the Supreme Court's formulations of the local control issue
essentially created a presumption in favor of the status quo and functioned
as restraints on the exercise of judicial remedial power to affect public
education.66 However, in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 167
and Crawford v. Board of Education,"8 the Court may have signaled a
shift in emphasis away from protection of local decisionmaking from
outside interference and toward protection of the integrity of the processes
by which communities exercise self-determination in educational decision-
making. The Court seemed eager to reinforce representative and par-
ticipatory principles in school district governance, rather than simply to
preserve the existing distribution of authority.69 This concern with the
processes of local control has been present in Court decisions for a long
time,70 but not so visibly as now. Concern for process and concern for the
substance of local control do not always dictate the same remedial ap-
proach. Protection of processes represents a restraint on judicial power but
does not automatically justify the status quo.
Milliken provides an illustration of the difference. There the Court of-
fered local control as a reason for rejecting interdistrict relief.", It is diffi-
cult to justify that decision as reinforcing representative principles in local
decisionmaking processes. School officials were not blamed for residential
segregation, but the Detroit metropolitan area was nevertheless divided
into nearly all-black and nearly all-white school districts.7 The pervasive
segregation in the schools was in no sense a product of democratic
processes. As in the nation as a whole, the majority of the population of
65. One court has cited concern for local control as a reason for favoring busing or student trans-
fers over redrawing district lines. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1114
(7th Cir.) (remedy most closely tailored to violation would be to expand boundaries of inner city
school district to city lines, but this "would have been far more intrusive into local political
processes"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980). It may not be constitutional for courts to order inter-
state school desegregation remedies in metropolitan areas that straddle state lines, especially where
two states had interstate compacts in the domain of public education. But cf School Dist. v. Missouri,
460 F. Supp. 421, 431, 435 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (claim in school segregation case that Kansas City,
Kansas, defendants had maintained climate of discrimination forcing blacks to resettle in Kansas City,
Missouri, held insufficient to invoke Missouri long-arm statute), appeal dismissed, 592 F.2d 493 (8th
Cir. 1979).
66. See cases cited supra note 62; Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977)
(Dayton I); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
67. 102 S. Ct. 3187 (1982).
68. 102 S. Ct. 3211 (1982).
69. Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 102 S. Ct. 3187, 3195-204 (1982).
70. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 742 (1974).
71. See supra p. 353.
72. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 799-800 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (more than
70% of Detroit schools had proportion of white or black students exceeding 90%).
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the Detroit area has not opposed integration."3 The creation of uniracial
electorates is, at best, an anomaly in representative processes."4
Where a significant causal connection can be established between state
housing decisions and school segregation, a court's concern for the integ-
rity of local processes should create a presumption that favors the housing
approach rather, than the status quo. Such a showing indicates that state
action has skewed the racial composition of school district electorates. In
this respect, the corrupting impact of housing discrimination on local deci-
sionmaking processes is analogous to that of racial gerrymandering.
15
Moreover, such a showing means that the decision about whether to have
integrated schools has been partially or entirely removed to another, more
distant level of government, the housing bureaucracy, which is not directly
responsive to local or popular will. In this respect, the effect of housing
discrimination resembles that of the unconstitutional Seattle anti-busing
law.
The Court's concern for local processes suggests that when state action
distorts the racial composition of school board electorates, redrawing dis-
trict lines as a remedial measure has advantages over busing or student
transfers. Such a remedy would counteract segregation not only in schools,
but in elections of school boards. Ronald Dworkin believes that desegrega-
tion decisions have often been intended not simply as a cure for past viola-
tions but as prophylactics to counteract the high probability of racism in
certain governmental decisionmaking processes.76 Redrawing school dis-
trict lines to remedy housing violations would both integrate the schools
and correct the systematic corruption of school board elections.
III. APPLICATION OF THE HOUSING APPROACH
A. The Extent of the Violation
Swann and its progeny indicate that the scope of the remedy in a school
desegregation case may not exceed the nature and extent of the violation.1
73. See Farley, Bianchi & Colasanto, supra note 45, at 105 (1976 study of whites in Detroit area
showed only 6% would feel "very uncomfortable" with one black per 13 whites in their neighborhood,
only 15% with three blacks per 11 whites, and only 29% with five blacks per nine whites).
74. Like the Milliken majority opinion, Justice Powell's dissent in Seattle expressed the substan-
tive side of the Court's concern for local control. Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 102 S. Ct.
3187, 3204-11 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell insisted several times that the case
concerned structural and substantive authority, and he charged the majority with intruding on the
rights of states to structure the decisionmaking operations of their local units. Id. at 3205, 3207, 3208,
3209, 3210 n.14, 3211 & n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
75. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (striking down a redrawing of city lines that
disenfranchised a disproportionately large number of blacks for purposes of municipal elections).
76. See Dworkin, supra note 55, at 11.
77. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (Milliken II); Milliken v. Brad-
ley, 418 U.S. 717, 738, 744-46 (1974) (Milliken I); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
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Courts should therefore tailor a housing-approach remedy to the scale of
school desegregation demonstrably caused by housing violations. This lim-
itation on equitable remedies has two polar interpretations. At one ex-
treme is the view of Justice Rehnquist that a court would have to find
that residential patterns were attributable "solely or principally" to state
action."8 At the other extreme is the standard that courts have applied to
direct state assistance to segregated schools: "any aid" at all is unconstitu-
tional if discriminatory intent of school officials is shown.79 Justice Stew-
art recommended an intermediate standard: The court should find a viola-
tion when a state imposes, fosters or encourages residential segregation
"in any significant measure. " so Lower courts have applied this last stan-
dard in housing-approach cases.8" Its obvious imprecision leaves consider-
able discretion to the trial courts.
In the late 1970's, however, it appeared that the "incremental segrega-
tive effect" requirement of Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman
(Dayton J)82 might severely restrict this discretion. This requirement calls
for untangling many complicated and interwoven strands of cause and ef-
fect, sorting out those state actions with identifiable segregative impact,
and devising a remedy to cure only the segregation caused by state ac-
tions.8 ' Rigid application of this rule could effectively bar relief through
the housing approach, for housing discrimination is inherently an indirect
cause of school segregation, and many significant forms of official housing
discrimination are as diffuse and intangible as they are pervasive.
However, it now appears unlikely for two reasons that Dayton I will
constitute a significant obstacle to the housing approach. First, the Su-
402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
78. See Delaware State Bd. of Educ. v. Evans, 446 U.S. 923, 927-28 (1980) (Evans VIII) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
79. Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833, 854 (E.D. La. 1967)
("[D]ecisions on the constitutionality of state involvement in private discrimination do not turn on
whether the state aid adds up to 51 percent or adds up to only 49 percent of the support of the
segregated institution"), aff'd per curiamn, 389 U.S. 571 (1968). The district court in Poindexter cited
other decisions that found constitutional violations despite the attenuation or obliqueness of state cau-
sation of private discrimination, 275 F. Supp. at 854-55. See Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413
P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966) (state constitutional amendment overturned because repeal of
earlier fair housing legislation by state created atmosphere conducive to racial discrimination), aff'd,
387 U.S. 369 (1967); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (requiring racial identification of
candidates on ballot furthers private discrimination); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961) (state action requirement fulfilled by state ownership of premises leased to restaurant that
discriminated).
80. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring); see Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1973) (textbook loans by state to students attending private segre-
gated schools unconstitutional because of "significant tendency" to facilitate and support private
discrimination).
81. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1109 (7th Cir.) (state action
must have had a significant rather than a de minimis effect), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
82. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
83. See Dayton 1, 433 U.S. at 420.
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preme Court apparently does not intend the test to apply to cases involv-
ing de jure segregation."' Second, even for cases of de facto segregation,
the courts may not apply the Dayton I test with such rigor as to thwart
the housing approach. In the Indianapolis case, the court stated that some
constitutional violations found by the court had effects that "cannot be
demonstrated statistically" but concluded that "it is reasonable to infer a
moderate indirect effect."8 5 The court also demonstrated that the incre-
mental effect standard could be applied to housing violations.8
B. Showing Causation
In the Wilmington and Indianapolis cases, the housing evidence mainly
involved public housing siting decisions. Such' evidence permits the courts
to say with precision how many black families were concentrated in the
ghetto and would have been integrated into other residential areas had
public housing been more evenly dispersed. Until at least the 1960's, pub-
lic housing agencies tended to concentrate housing projects in large Ameri-
can cities87 and maintain separate waiting lists by race to perpetuate seg-
84. Id. at 410 n.4 (noting that racially segregated schools had been illegal in Ohio since 1888).
Dayton I left open the possibility that, in de jure cases, meeting the standards of Swann and Keyes
would suffice because a de jure school system is presumed to be segregated throughout, not merely
incrementally. This possibility was tested when the Wilmington district court issued its remedial
plans. That court stated it was "fully cognizant" that the plans were formulated without "exacting
consideration" of whether they would return schools to the position they would have been in but for
the violations of housing and school officials. Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1009 (D. Del.)
(Evans VIII), affid, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980). On review, the
court of appeals conceded that no Dayton I inquiry had been undertaken by the district court but
excused this omission on the grounds that Wilmington had previously been subject to de jure segrega-
tion. Evans VIII, 582 F.2d at 763-64 (case distinguished from Dayton I on grounds that Delaware
law mandated school segregation until 1954). Justice Rehnquist protested that the Court had never
exempted cases of de jure segregation from the Dayton I inquiry. 446 U.S. at 925 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). In the Indianapolis suit, the Seventh Circuit similarly concluded
that no Dayton I inquiry was needed because school segregation had been sanctioned by a state law
preventing expansion of the inner city school district as the city grew. United States v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1113 (7th Cir.) (incremental effect test applies if only isolated examples of
discrimination are established, as in Denver, Columbus and Dayton, where discrimination often af-
fected only one school district at a time), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
85. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 506 F. Supp. 657, 670 (S.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
86. Before deciding that the incremental segregative effect standard was irrelevant, the Seventh
Circuit had remanded the case for application of the Dayton I inquiry. United States v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d. 400, 414 (7th Cir.) (urging district court "explicitly" to consider Dayton I
test). On remand, the district court provided an example of the sensible application of the incremental
effect standard to housing violations in a housing-approach case. Having determined the precise num-
ber of black pupils (4,958) concentrated in the inner city school district by public housing siting
decisions, the court ordered that a roughly 60% greater number of students (8,000 to 8,500) partici-
pate in the interdistrict transfer remedy, reasoning that there tends to be some movement of blacks
into private housing around public housing sites. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 456 F.
Supp. 183, 190 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Indianapolis V), later opinion, 506 F. Supp. 657, 670 (S.D. Ind.
1979), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838
(1980).
87. ABA ADVISORY COMM'N ON HoUSING AND URBAN GROWTH, HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER
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regation.88 The evaporation of public funding for housing has made it
impossible to correct this situation with housing remedies."9
Courts can also rely on evidence that does not permit such easy quanti-
fication. The pre-Milliken Kalamazoo decision rested heavily on the lin-
gering effects of state-enforced restrictive covenants.9 Use of this kind of
evidence requires plaintiffs to provide a historical perspective on the devel-
opment of racial concentration, in order to demonstrate the link between
current patterns of segregation and former official practices. The same is
true of evidence that federal mortgage and loan guarantee programs ad-
ministered by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans
Administration (VA) promoted residential segregation. Several courts have
taken note of this phenomenon. 1 For years, the FHA and VA refused to
provide financing for blacks who wanted to move out of the ghetto.9 2 The
notorious FHA Underwriters Manual made perpetuation of segregation a
matter of ethics for real estate brokers." State governments have fre-
LAW 21-23 (1978).
88. See id. at 22 n.102; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 46-47; see also
United States v. Housing Auth., 504 F. Supp. 716, 728, 733 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (striking down munici-
pal citizenship requirement for public housing where city had no black residents since 1940's).
89. Although the 1960's were a turning point, racial concentration through public housing deci-
sions or official foot-dragging on residential integration is still significant. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, HOME OWNERSHIP FOR LOWER INCOME FAMILIES 89 (1971) (segregation perpetuated
through Section 235 program); Orfield, The Role of Local and Federal Governtnents in Neighborhood
Segregation, INTEGRATEDUCATION, May-Aug. 1979, at 48, 52 (overall impact of St. Louis housing
programs probably inhibits integrated education).
90. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143, 181-82 (W.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd sub
noma. Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963
(1975). Until the Supreme Court declared such covenants unconstitutional in 1948, Shelley v. Krae-
mer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), they were very common in cities. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 51, at 3 (use of covenants "widespread" after 1917). In some cities racial covenants were still
recorded in deeds in the 1970's. See Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 434 (D. Del.) (three-judge
court) (Evans II) (unconstitutional racially restrictive covenants recorded in New Castle County real
estate deeds until 1973), aff'd per curiam, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
91. See, e.g., Liddell v. Board of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1324 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (refusal of
FHA to insure mortgages prevented black movement into suburbs), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. United
States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp.
708, 788 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Reed I) (FHA recommended use of racial covenants two years after they
were declared unconstitutional in 1948); Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E.D. Mich.
1971) (noting continuing effects of FHA and VA open advocacy of maintenance of racially harmoni-
ous neighborhoods in Detroit), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
92. See J. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN AMERICA 30-44 (1980) (brief, well-documented account of
discriminatory impact of FHA and VA policies); Foley, Institutional and Contextual Factors Affect-
ing the Housing Choices of Minority Residents, in SEGREGATION IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS 85, 118-22
(A. Hawley & V. Rock eds. 1973) (same).
93. See Reed I, 422 F. Supp. at 788 (FHA manual "contained a blatantly separationist policy");
Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 434 (D. Del.) (three-judge court) (Evans II) (manual in use
until 1949 advocated racially homogenous neighborhoods), aff'd per curiam, 423 U.S. 963 (1975);
Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143, 182-83 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (FHA manual in
use until 1950's discouraged introduction of "inharmonious racial groups" into communities and ad-
vised that neighborhoods would prove far less stable and desirable if children are compelled to attend
school where majority or "goodly number" of pupils "represent a far lower level of society, or an
incompatible racial element"), aff'd sub nor. Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178
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quently failed, and still do fail, to use their licensing powers against real-
tors who discriminate.9"
Although they are not arms of the state, federal agencies can be joined
as defendants along with state agencies or ordered to participate in reme-
dies on grounds of privity. 95 The nature of HUD's involvement in local
housing projects makes privity easy to demonstrate."
Some other forms of state action have not influenced school desegrega-
tion decisions, so far as the published opinions reveal. These include prac-
tices of agencies not directly responsible for housing. For example, explic-
itly racial zoning ordinances have been unconstitutional since 1917,"' but
remained on the books in many places until the 1950's."8 Siting decisions
for highways and other public works projects have also often promoted
racial concentration or served to demarcate racial areas.99
(6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
94. See J. KUSHNER, supra note 92, at 52-56; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 64, at
25. In Delaware, the court found that the state not only sanctioned discrimination practiced by the
real estate industry but published a primer for realtors which until 1970 included in its Code of
Ethics a provision adopted from the code of a realtors' national organization counseling that a realtor
"should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood. . . members of any race or na-
tionality . . . whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values . . . ." Evans v.
Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 434 (D. Del.) (three-judge court) (Evans II), affd per curiam, 423
U.S. 963 (1975). In the Kalamazoo case, the trial court similarly noted that the State of Michigan not
only failed to use its licensing power against realtors who promoted segregation but made preservation
of segregation an ethical obligation of realtors, at least until 1948, through the Code of Ethics pub-
lished by the State Department of Real Estate. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143,
183 (W.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd sub nor. Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); see also United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate
Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (realtors' organization interfered with enjoyment of
rights guaranteed by the Fair Housing Act by promulgating standards that would cause appraisers to
treat race and national origin as negative factors in determining value of dwellings and soundness of
home loans).
95. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 444 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (Kansas City)
(granting school children standing to sue HUD, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and
Department of Transportation on equal protection claims although children did not themselves receive
housing or highway benefits), appeal disinissed, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979); Hart v. Community
School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (HUD participation necessary for effective im-
plementation of court's decree so HUD is "in privity" with city defendants), appeal dismissed, 497
F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
96. HUD normally cooperates with state agencies in funding and making decisions about siting
and constructing public housing. In the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Title VIII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601,
3610 (1976), Congress placed on HUD not merely a duty to respond to complaints of discrimination
in federally aided housing, but an affirmative duty to achieve fair housing goals.
97. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80-82 (1917).
98. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 3 (attempts to enforce such ordinances
in the courts continued through 1950's).
99. See Sloane, supra note 2, at 85-86. Claims that highway siting decisions promoted residential
segregation are part of the ongoing Kansas City litigation. See supra note 21 (discussing status of
case); see also supra note 15 (lower court's findings of segregative effect of various state agency deci-
sions in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)); J. KUSHNER, supra note
92, at 44-52, 56-63, 86-91 (surveying discriminatory effects of local land use and tax policies).
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C. Showing Discriminatory Intent
In 1976 and 1977, the Supreme Court defined strict standards for
showing discriminatory intent in equal protection cases.100 The impact of
these requirements on the housing approach was soon tested: The Indian-
apolis school desegregation case was one of five which the Court vacated
and remanded for reconsideration in light of the new standards. 01 On
remand, the district court set aside all of the evidence of housing discrimi-
nation except the public housing siting decisions. From the siting decisions
alone, however, the court found proof of discriminatory intent in a combi-
nation of circumstantial evidence, foreseeability of consequences, and the
absence of credible alternative explanations for siting. 02 Thus, the Indi-
anapolis case has withstood the new tests.
The Supreme Court's refusal to review the Indianapolis decision leaves
standing the use of housing discrimination evidence in a school desegrega-
tion case, but it also leaves some questions unanswered. Perhaps the re-
fusal only represents the Court's deference to the trial court's findings of
fact on the issue of intent.10 On the other hand, the Court may be re-
treating from the strict standards of purposiveness laid down in 1976 and
1977. A recent voting rights case decided under the equal protection
clause reconfirmed the value of circumstantial evidence for determination
of intent.10 The best evidence of leniency in applying the equal protection
intent standard to school desegregation cases comes from two 1979 in-
tradistrict school desegregation cases which saw the Court recognize that
intent may be embedded in institutional practices and attenuated over
time, and that foreseeable discriminatory impact provides evidence of dis-
criminatory intent.10 5 In general, the federal courts have applied the intent
100. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-45 (1976) (invidiousness must ultimately be
traced to purposeful discrimination); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 265-68 (1977) (setting out factors to be considered in assessing official motivation). The
Court required only that a discriminatory purpose be a motivating, not necessarily the dominant or
primary, factor in decisionmaking. Id. at 265-66.
101. The five remanded cases were Dayton 1, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), Brennan v. Armstrong, 433
U.S. 672 (1977) (Milwaukee); School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977) (Omaha); Board of
School Comm'rs v. United States, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977) (Indianapolis); Austin Indep. School Dist. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
102. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 456 F. Supp. 183, 189 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Indian-
apolis V), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 838 (1980). Although a dissenter from the Seventh Circuit's affirmance'of this decision argued
that it reflected an overly lenient interpretation of the Supreme Court's standards, United States v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d at 1118-21 (Tone, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court denied
certiorari, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
103. See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3278 (1982); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct.
1781, 1789-91 (1982) (presence of discriminatory intent "pure question of fact" subject to "clearly
erroneous" standard of appellate review).
104. See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3278-81 (voting rights case upholding district court find-
ing, absent direct evidence, of discriminatory purpose behind at-large electoral system).
105. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 535-40 (1979) (Dayton I1); Columbus Bd.
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requirement leniently in school desegregation cases, perhaps because the
courts are relatively more familiar with the complex and oblique strategies
used to preserve school segregation.106 Thus, it is not surprising that the
Indianapolis decision has survived. Although the housing approach re-
quires the fact finder to inquire into the purposes of housing officials, it
should logically benefit from any tendency on the part of the courts to
conduct that inquiry with due allowances for the subtlety state and local
government entities have shown in promoting segregation in schools.
CONCLUSION
Interdistrict school desegregation relief should be available whenever a
court finds that governmental housing decisions have contributed signifi-
cantly to metropolitan-wide school segregation. Such a finding should acti-
vate an assumption that state agencies act as arms of a single sovereign.
Such a finding should also create a presumption that state action has
skewed the processes of local educational decisionmaking. Findings of fact
in particular cases, along with social science evidence, have eroded the
non-responsibility of government rationale that courts have offered for re-
sisting the housing approach to school desegregation relief. Doctrinal ob-
stacles like the "incremental segregative effect" and discriminatory intent
requirements no longer appear insuperable. The housing approach still
presents problems, but it holds far more promise today than it did in the
late 1970's.
-Robert R. Harding
of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65, 467-68 (1979).
106. For the argument that the intent standard should be applied more leniently in school deseg-
regation cases than in other areas of equal protection law, see Sullivan, The Intent Requirement in
Desegregation Cases: The Inapplicability of Washington v. Davis, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 325, 329-30
(1981) (effects of school segregation are psychologically debilitating, and states have special responsi-
bilities in area of public education).
